Papers

• Strategic Partners or Reluctant Allies? Russia’s and China’s Reactions to the Post-2021 Political Reality in Myanmar Michał Lubina Jagiellonian University in Krakow

  The civil war in Myanmar, ongoing since 1948 and intensifying after the 2021 coup, has largely been observed from the sidelines by the international community. Most foreign actors have limited themselves to ineffective diplomatic initiatives (ASEAN neighbours), moral condemnation (the West), or tacit acceptance of the military regime (India). There are, however, two notable exceptions: Russia and China. Moscow has clearly supported the coup and the post-coup rule of Min Aung Hlaing, becoming the most pro-junta power among major states. China, by contrast, initially adopted a more ambiguous stance. While it reluctantly accepted the coup as a fait accompli, it was unwilling to grant Min Aung Hlaing full legitimacy. This position shifted in the years 2024–2025, when Beijing moved from a wait-and-see approach to a more open acceptance of the military regime, playing a significant role in the junta’s ongoing counteroffensive against democratic resistance forces. Why did China change its position? Has Russia influenced Beijing’s stance on the Burmese crisis? What are the bilateral Sino-Russian calculations regarding Myanmar? And what does this reveal about the broader strategic calculus of Russia and China?

• Japan’s Myanmar Policy Five Years After the Coup Makiko Takeda Aichi Gakuin University Naing Tun Independent Researcher

  When the Myanmar military staged a coup d’état on 1 February 2021, Japan’s response differed noticeably from that of its Western allies. While several democratic partners moved quickly to impose sanctions, suspend aspects of economic engagement, and issue unequivocal condemnations, Tokyo limited its initial reaction to expressions of concern while maintaining existing channels of engagement. This relatively restrained position is particularly striking given the depth of Japan–Myanmar ties, often described as “special relations” built over decades through military exchanges, the ODA-centric development cooperation, and interpersonal and cultural links. This paper examines Japan’s Myanmar policy in the five years since the coup and argues that it reveals not only a persistent tension between Japan’s self-image as a democratic actor promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and its longstanding links with Myanmar’s military, but also a structural transformation in the economic foundation of bilateral relations. Before the coup, Japan’s engagement relied heavily on ODA-centered development diplomacy, infrastructure projects, and investment-led cooperation. After the coup, however, this model became increasingly difficult to sustain politically, morally, and practically, as continued engagement drew criticism and conditions inside Myanmar sharply deteriorated. At the same time, labor mobility began to emerge as a more important channel linking the two countries. Using a framework that combines the shift from development-centered economic diplomacy to migration-based economic interdependence with the interaction of push and pull factors, this paper argues that post-coup Japan–Myanmar relations are being reconfigured rather than simply weakened. As ODA- and development-based engagement became increasingly constrained, labor mobility emerged as a more politically manageable channel through which bilateral economic ties could be sustained. This shift has also been facilitated by the Japanese government through support for migration-related infrastructure, including visa processing and labor-related language and training pathways. In this sense, labor migration has come to function as a less exposed but still effective form of pragmatic engagement, allowing Japan to maintain economic links with Myanmar while avoiding the more direct political and moral costs associated with ODA and development projects that risk benefiting the military.

• The Myanmar Coup and the Erosion of ASEAN Centrality Chosein Yamahata Aichi Gakuin University Shwe Mying Maung Technological University Council

  Myanmar’s post-coup revolution has produced an even more fragmented landscape of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). This paper argues that Myanmar’s great power neighbours particularly China and India — have strategically cultivated relationships with specific EAOs as instruments of border security, economic access, and indirect influence, and that this has deepened ASEAN’s institutional paralysis over Myanmar. By establishing bilateral patronage networks with non-state armed actors, both powers have created channels of influence that bypass ASEAN-led processes entirely, exploiting rather than challenging the organization’s norm of non-interference. The paper contends that understanding ASEAN’s failures in Myanmar, therefore, requires looking beyond the organization’s internal consensus problems to the external incentive structures that make those problems entrenched.

• Tourism, Ethnicity, and Securitization: Rethinking Governance in the Indo-Myanmar Frontier Satoshi Ota Tama University Soumen Mitra IIEST Shibpur

  The Indo–Myanmar borderlands, encompassing four states in India (i.e. Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram) and three states in Myanmar (i.e. Kachin, Sagain, and Chin) constitute a complex edge where trans-boundary ecological systems, ethnic identities, and geopolitical dynamics intersect. Shared natural resources—including forests, biodiversity corridors, and river systems such as the Chindwin River–Barak River basin—are increasingly strained by weak and uneven governance, permeable borders, shifting cultivation due to climate and socio-political changes, illegal extraction, and expanding unplanned infrastructure. Concurrently, emerging tourism offers livelihood opportunities for indigenous communities but often evolves in unregulated forms, intensifying ecological degradation and cultural commodification. These pressures have been significantly amplified by the 2021 Myanmar military coup, which has triggered cross-border refugee flows from Myanmar’s Chin State into India’s Northeast. Ethno-linguistic affinities with Kuki-Zomi populations have reshaped local demographic dynamics, aggravating longstanding tensions among Kuki, Meitei, and Naga communities, particularly in Manipur. The resulting conflicts accentuate the fragility of governance structures in the region. India’s response, situated within its Neighbourhood First policy, has largely relied on securitized measures, including the suspension of the Free Movement Regime, border fencing, and militarized controls. While intended to ensure stability, these approaches often marginalize local stakeholders and fail to address the interconnected challenges of resource governance, mobility, and identity politics. This paper advocates a transition toward integrated and inclusive governance frameworks that synergize community-based resource management, strengthened cross-border institutional cooperation, and carefully regulated sustainable eco-tourism. Emphasizing participatory decision-making, such approaches can empower ethnic communities, enhance livelihood security, and ensure equitable resource distribution. In a fragile trans-boundary context marked by ecological stress and socio-political volatility, these strategies are critical for maintaining environmental resilience, reducing conflict, and fostering long-term regional stability.

Abstract

Keywords

• 2021 Coup
• ASEAN centrality
• Burma
• China
• FOIP
• Japan–Myanmar relations
• Myanmar
• Russia
• military
• post-coup policy
• regional order
• societal legitimacy